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THE ETHICAL ROLES OF ATTORNEY/LITERARY AGENTS
Introduction: The Scenario
You are the newly appointed managing literary agent for a liter-
ary agency run within your 125 attorney law firm. Your first day in the
position, you receive an unsolicited submission for a novel entitled
THE Gossip SHOP about the exploits and dilemmas of a third year law
student trying to land the job and love of his life while simultaneously
attempting to complete his third year law school requirements. The
proposed novel focuses on the struggles of this student as he deals
with a "tough-as-nails" job market, the escalating demands imposed
by ever-increasing tuition payments, and the void created by devoting
one's life to the pursuit of learning without fully grasping the realities
of everyday life. The proposed novel is narrated through student gos-
sip. You find the idea gripping and poignant.
This Article will return to this scenario, with numerous variations,
to analyze the potential problems facing attorney/literary agents
(ALAs). One scenario includes what happens when an attorney, act-
ing in the same literary agency, believes to have two similar projects
which could potentially cause a conflict of interest.' Additionally, I
will examine cases in which the ALA succeeds in finding an offer for
the client author's (CA's) work, but because of the code of legal eth-
ics, finds herself "hamstrung" during negotiations. Unless she has
made prior contractual arrangements in the ALA-CA agreement, she
would be in a no-win situation. But, before discussing the ethical
problems faced by ALAs, this Article will examine why some lawyers
choose to become literary agents.
I
When Lawyers Became Literary Agents, or Why
Editor Maxwell Perkins Is Rotating in His
Grave like an Airborne Propeller
Publishing was once considered an occupation for gentlemen and
gentlewomen 3 engaged in the pursuit of higher learning and literary
expression of that erudition.4 For some, this remains the case. For the
vast majority of individuals working in commercial publishing, how-
ever, there is little if any room for esoterica at the expense of the
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limita-
tions of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 79, 81 (1989) (discussing gender based discrimination in the workplace).
4. See generally, CLARKSON N. POTTER, WHO DOES WHAT & WHY IN BOOK PUB-
LISHING: WRITERS, EDITORS AND MONEY MEN (1990).
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bottom line.5 Commercial publishing is driven by an ever-increasing
number of large publishers, products of huge entertainment conglom-
erates that are swallowing up publishing companies. The powerful
sales forces of these houses use their "power of the pencil": booksell-
ers give their sales representatives the authority to write orders with-
out consulting the publishing house, pumping books into the public's
collective consciousness through local B. Dalton, Barnes & Noble,
and Waldenbooks chainstores.6
To combat what was perceived as an unfair monopoly developing
among these few powerhouse publishers, power agents, led by law-
yers-turned-literary agents, have cropped up throughout the literary
landscape.7 Morton Janklow, one of the most successful members of
this new breed, has been so successful in leveraging top literary talent
against the publishing giants that he recently landed a twenty-five mil-
lion dollar advance for Sidney Sheldon's latest book deal. In 1981,
that same amount purchased Avon Books, an entire publishing house,
for its current parent-publisher, William Morrow.8 Janklow appears
indefatigable after his recent orchestration of the sale of the Pope's
tome, Crossing the Threshold of Hope, to Alfred A. Knopf for the
worldly sum of $10 million. Because the Pope's last book was consid-
ered a commercial failure, the sale was deemed quite a success.9
Janklow is not alone: In Boston, Palmer & Dodge, a powerful 145
attorney law firm, recently opened its own in-house literary agency.10
Due to the perceived strength of the Boston-based law firm/literary
agency, Boston's literary agents actually welcomed the move as an in-
road into the exceptionally tight New York publishing market.1' The
action produced legal ethics complications, however, especially in the
conflicts of interest area.12 Currently, Palmer & Dodge also serves as
house counsel for publisher Little, Brown & Co. and has thus agreed
not to submit its clients' books to this publisher.' 3 Despite this action,
5. Id.
6. BRAD BUNNIN & PETER BEREN, THE WRITER'S LEGAL COMPANION (1988).
7. See, e.g., Peter Lennon, Portrait: Agent to the Vicar of Rome, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 26, 1994, at 10.
8. Id
9. Id.
10. Beth Wolfensberger, Firm Bookish on Boston, 10 BOSTON Bus. J., May 21, 1990,
n,13 § 1, at 8.
11. Id.
12. Model Rule 1.7 states: "(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa-
tion of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reason-
ably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client; and (2) each client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULE(S)] Rule 1.7 (1983).
13. See Wolfensberger, supra note 10.
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establishment of the in-house literary agency could be perceived as a
conflict of loyalty, as the law firm/literary agency may in the future
represent authors in competition with the clients of Little, Brown &
Co.14 As yet, however, Palmer & Dodge has not found this to be the
case, and the law firm/literary agency is enjoying the opportunity to
not only review authors' contracts, but to have some input in deter-
mining their content as well.' 5
The movement of lawyers into the agents' field began neither
with Morton Janklow nor Palmer & Dodge. In fact, the legendary
literary and talent agent Irving "Swifty" Lazar started out in the 1930s
as an entertainment attorney. He then joined MCA and decided to
become an agent, after discovering that an agent's "cut" was ten per-
cent, as opposed to an attorney's one percent. 16 Swifty Lazar often
sold the works of individuals he did not represent and many times
represented both the buyer and seller of the same work. 17 Further-
more, he had no written contracts with his clients, harboring the belief
that "just a handshake is enough."'"
Considered by many to be the most powerful talent agent in the
entertainment industry, Michael Ovitz also attended law school, but
never completed his legal education.' 9 In developing one of the
megawatt talent agencies of the nineties, Creative Artists Agency
(CAA),20 Ovitz observed that young, agentless actors were employing
"entertainment lawyers of the new activist breed, who not only scruti-
nized their client's [sic] contracts but, like agents, increasingly
brokered deals."'" He lured these lawyers into working for and deal-
ing with CAA by advertising his agency as a "literary and talent
agency. '"22 CAA's credo was that material came first, and, because
they could find the best scripts at Ovitz's agency, the stars followed.23
Interestingly, representing writers as a means to gain power in the
Hollywood community was also the approach adopted by Ziffren,
14. The Comment to Model Rule 1.7 espouses the view that "[loyalty is an essential
element in the lawyer's relationship to a client."
15. See Wolfensberger, supra note 10.
16. Peter B. Flint, Irving Swifty Lazar, 86, Dies, Dynamic Agent and a Star Himself,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1994, at 9.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Move over, Warner and Goldwyn; Meet the Mogul Who Forged the MCA Deal,
REC., Dec. 2, 1990, at B1.
20. Mr. Ovitz left CAA in 1995 to become President of the Walt Disney Co. 1995 in
Review, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Jan. 8, 1996, at 16.
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Id.
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Brittenham, & Brancaan, the exceptionally successful entertainment
law firm.24 In fact, "Ziffren and Brittenham first set their sights on
what was at the time the least glamorous area of the business: TV
writer-producers."25
Presumably, this new breed of lawyers acting as literary agents
must encounter certain legal ethics dilemmas. It follows that there
should be a breadth of legal articles exploring such a topic. However,
though attorney representation in other portions of the entertainment
industry.has been addressed, particularly in the fields of sports26 and
music, 27 attorney representation for authors is an area which is greatly
lacking in attention.
There are a number of contractual roles that attorney representa-
tives can perform throughout the entertainment industry. For exam-
ple, in the music industry, there may be artist-agent, artist-personal
manager, songwriter-publisher, and artist-record company relation-
ships.28 The differences among these arrangements often turn on the
amount of involvement that the representative has in the artist's ca-
reer and the percentage of the artist's profits that the representative
receives.29 Personal managers frequently have the greatest involve-
ment in the artist's career, possibly assisting the artist with such per-
sonal matters as income management. For their services, personal
managers may take as much as one third of the artist's profits.30
Similar relationships exist in the publishing industry, though liter-
ary agents' fees currently range only between ten to fifteen percent of
the client's payment. 31 Literary agents are the most popular form of
author representation. However, many authors also seek representa-
24. D.M. Osborne, The Players, AM. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 60.
25. • Id at 64.
26. See, e.g., Curtis D. Rympa, Note, Sports Agents Representing Athletes: The Need
for Comprehensive State Legislation, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 481 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Hal I. Gilenson, Note, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of
Interest in the Music Industry, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 501 (1991).
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, AGENTS OF OPPORTUNITY: SORTS
AGENTS AND CORRUPTION IN COLLEGIATE SPORTS 11 (1990) (discussing "full service
firms" which differ from agents in that they are heavily involved in managing the athlete's
finances).
30. Shropshire, supra note 29. Additionally, although personal managers are not com-
mon to the literary realm, attorneys acting as personal managers would be able to argue
that the 30% fees charged are not unethical based on MODEL RULE 1.5 regarding Fees.
Arguably, these fees are similar in nature to the one-third contingency fees charged by
attorneys in personal injury cases. In both instances, it is impossible to determine whether
the client will succeed, and thus the large expenditure of time invested by the attorney
warrants a larger fee.
31. See, e.g., JEFF HERMAN, THE INSIDER'S GUIDE TO BOOK EDITORS, PUBLISHERS,
AND LITERARY AGENTS (1994).
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tion from others, including publicists, for promotional purposes.32
Unlike literary agents, publicists are not directly involved in the sale
of the author's works. Given that the more visible an author is to the
public, the greater the likelihood that the author's books will sell, pub-
licists earn their livelihood by marketing the author to savvy
publishers.33
With few exceptions, most notably John Grisham and Stephen
King, authors rarely attain the degree of public recognition afforded
actors and actresses. Nevertheless, writing and publishing books has
formed the bedrock of the entertainment industry.34 Novels, also re-
ferred to as "properties, 35 that prove commercially successful are
often the basis of motion pictures. As more attorneys seek to repre-
sent authors in deals and to broker projects, it becomes imperative to
consider and contrast the ethical responsibilities of the ALAs and
their nonattorney counterparts.
ALAs may encounter significant pitfalls when representing their
CAs. Examining these, while bearing in mind the similarities and dif-
ferences between the ALAs and their nonattorney counterparts,
raises several questions: (1) What are the ethical guidelines which gov-
ern attorney conduct in the context of representing authors? (2) Are
nonlawyer literary agents at a disadvantage when dealing with attor-
neys? (3) What standard safeguards should be contained in boilerplate
contracts between the ALA and the clients they represent? (4) How
does the Association of Authors' Representatives (AAR) 36 ethical
code parallel or diverge from the Lawyer's Code of Ethics? Finally,
certain states have passed legislation to police talent agents. This Ar-
ticle will examine one such piece: the 1978 California Talent Agency
Act, which governs talent agents conducting business in California,
and will analyze the statute's impact on attorneys who represent
authors.
Part II of this article will focus on lawyers' ethical responsibilities
in their role as literary representatives. Part III will propose several
safeguards for ALAs and their CAs by recommending the inclusion of
key contract clauses. Part IV will juxtapose the roles and responsibili-
ties of lawyer and nonlawyer literary agents. Finally, Part V will ex-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., POTTER, supra note 4.
35. Martin P. Levin, A New Guide to Negotiating the Author-Publisher Contract, 6
CARDOZO ARTS & ErNr. L. J. 411, 412 (1988); see also The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
36. The AAR is the trade organization for literary agents. See HERMAN, supra note
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plore the mechanisms for policing each group primarily through the
Association of Authors' Representatives Code of Ethics and the 1978
California Talent Agency Act.
H
Potential Ethical Pitfalls for Attorneys Acting as
Authors' Agents
A. Conflict of Interest
Scenario One: What if THE Gossip SHOP was similar to another
project being considered by your literary agency? The other project
has not been signed, but it has been discussed at a round table discus-
sion with other literary agents where you work. Further complicating
matters, the other project is by a best-selling author over whom your
firm has been salivating for years and desperately wants to land as a
client. You would like to represent THE Gossip SHOP, but you fear a
conflict of interest. What should you do?
Manuscripts are termed "properties"37 and are routinely ex-
ploited for their derivative rights, including foreign translation, mo-
tion picture, television, and video rights. Despite the "properties"
classification, there are vast differences between a real estate agent
who represents sellers of real property and a literary agent who bro-
kers authors' works. Because it is highly unlikely that real property
can be changed to resemble other property, a real estate agent can
represent numerous clients with similar properties without a conflict
of interest.
Suppose that instead of our fictional ALA, we are dealing with a
real estate agent who is representing two homes in an area where buy-
ers are known to prefer centrally-located brick houses. Based on this
criteria, one of these homes is very marketable because of its brick
facade, hard wood floors, and accessible location while the other
home, a wood-frame dwelling in a secluded area, is not as marketable.
The real estate agent's only method of making the second property
more marketable is to build on the strengths of what it already has
going for it. The agent can advertise the home as a perfect "getaway"
because of its secluded nature, but cannot practically move the house
to make it as centrally-located as the first.
By contrast, in the area of intellectual property, the advent of
computers has allowed a manuscript to be significantly altered to re-
semble another "property." Plagiarism and outright theft are rampant
37. See Levin, supra note 35.
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problems for authors.3" Proof becomes 'an important factor in at-
tempting to show that an author or author's agent did not copy an-
other work to which they had previously been exposed.39 Due to the
limited marketplace of publishers, even if two works are not exactly
alike, one project may occupy another project's niche.4" Thus,
although there is room for many houses in the market, the literary
market will often accommodate only one work.
Let us add to our scenario the fact that THE Gossip SHOP propo-
sal was not precisely similar to the other proposal that the law firm-
literary agency acquired. The firm-agency determined, however, that
portions of this new proposal would make the already-signed work
more marketable. Even if the changes would only consist of adopting
ideas, which are not protected under copyright law, as opposed to the
actual expression of these ideas, such as lifting passages from the work
itself,41 the attorney considering THE Gossip SHOP would be hard-
pressed to represent this work. There may be a conflict of interest in
the "literary firm" based upon the similarity between the markets for
the first project and THi GossiP SHOP.
ABA Model Rule 1.7 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship'with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation. 42
In the above situation, a nonattorney literary agent might be
tempted to risk a potential copyright infringement claim because of
the difficulty an author would have proving that the copied material
was the expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves.43 However,
ALAs constrained by the Model Rules must also consider the legal
ethics ramifications of their actions that might cause a conflict of inter-
est. These potential conflict of interest problems are greatest in large
literary firms where, as in a large law firm, there is a great number of
lawyer agents representing competitors for the same buyers. It is criti-
cal for these ALAs to consult one another frequently and to commu-
nicate CA project lists to avoid potential conflicts of interest.
38. See Michael L. Sharb, Comment, Getting a "Total Concept and Feel" of Copyright
Infringement, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 903, 906 (1993); Laurie Steams, Comment, Copy
Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CAL. L. REv. 513 (1992).
39. Sharb, supra note 38, at 908.
40. See BUNNIN & BEREN, supra note 6.
41. See Steams, supra note 38.
42. MODEL RuLE 1.7 (1983) (providing guidance on conflict avoidance).
43. See Steams, supra note 38.
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In short, the Model Rules dictate that our ALA should tell THE
Gossip SHOP author to seek representation elsewhere. This is an out-
come which might not have occurred had the literary agent been a lay
person or nonlawyer.
B. Scope of Representation: Hamstringing Attorney/Literary Agents
During Negotiations
Scenario two: After consulting with your fellow ALAs, you real-
ize that THE Gossip SHOP is actually a vastly. different project than
anything the agency currently represents. You therefore agree to rep-
resent the author. After "shopping the project" to several publishers,
you receive a $5,000 offer from one publishing house. From your ex-
perience as a seasoned literary agent, you realize that this is only the
first offer and that you should press for a better deal for your client.
However, you are also a lawyer who is bound by the Model Rules.
What should you do? The Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent employed to buy or to sell is sub-
ject to a duty to the principal; within the limits set by the principal's
directions, to be loyal to the principal's interests and -to use reason-
able care to obtain terms which best satisfy the manifested purposes
of the principal. 4
Assuming that an agency relationship has developed between the
CA and ALA,45 it is imperative that the agent be given the latitude to
negotiate the best possible deal for the client. If this is not provided
for in an Agency Agreement between the author and the ALA, the
ALA will be obligated to consult her client at every juncture of the
negotiations,46 which slows down the process and can sabotage the
agent's efforts to strike a more favorable bargain for the client.
To avoid problems in this area, the CA-ALA contract should ad-
dress this issue, providing the ALA with the latitude to negotiate on
behalf of the client.47 It is critical that the ALA and the client con-
tractually agree as to exactly what powers the attorney will have in
negotiating so that both parties fully understand how much latitude
the agent will be allowed.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 424 (1958).
45. Agency is defined as the fiduciary relationship which results from the manifesta-
tion of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act. Id. § 1.
46. Model Rule 1.2 states in pertinent part: "(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and
(e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are pursued." MODEL
RULE 1.2 (1983).
47. See infra Part IV.
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C. Competency of Attorney/Agents Representing Authors: What
Consideration Should Be Paid to Qualifications?
What does it take to be a literary agent: an agency name? Some
stationary with that name on it? A phone with a message machine?
Conceivably, one could conduct all business through a post office box,
avoiding even the need for office space. In fact, nonattorneys have no
obligation to gain a mastery of the publishing industry and publishing
contracts before they begin representing authors before publishing
houses, unless they voluntarily decide to join trade organizations, such
as the Association of Author's Representatives.48 But is this same
standard applicable to the attorney who also wears the hat of "literary
agent?"
Is every law school graduate qualified to represent authors in the
sale of their work based on his or her preparation in first year con-
tracts? Yes and no. ALAs, unlike their nonlawyer counterparts, have
an ethical duty under Model Rule 1.1 to competently represent their
clients: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thor-
oughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa-
tion."'49 As the Comment to this Rule provides:
Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining
what kinds of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that
necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A law-
yer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field
through necessary study. Competent representation can also be
provided through the association of a lawyer of established compe-
tence in the field in question. 50
ALAs are not precluded from taking on work with which they are
unfamiliar, such as publishing contracts and other transactions in the
complex publishing industry. These ALAs have, however, an affirma-
tive duty to educate themselves about this area of the law, just as they
would about insurance or products liability. Often, the ALA will be
expected to function not only as a salesperson, but also as a contrac-
tual consultant. When acting in such a capacity, the Model Rules dic-
tate that these ALAs educate themselves about the nuances of this
species of contract.
48. See HERMAN, supra note 31; see also infra Part V.
49. MODEL RULE 1.1 (1983).
50. Idt cmt.
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D. Confidentiality in the Context of Attorney/Agent - Client/Author
Break-Ups
Scenario three: Assuming that the author of THE Gossip SHOP
decides to terminate his relationship with the agent, what information
may be brought out by the ALA to establish breach of contract and
what information is protected by the attorney-client privilege?
Model Rule 1.6 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation .
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent that the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (2) to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client .... 51
Based on this rule of legal conduct, an ALA would be well within
her rights to reveal information normally protected under the attor-
ney-client privilege, in order to protect herself, if the CA breached his
contract with her. Nonlawyer literary agents can also be held liable
for revealing confidences because they have a fiduciary duty to their
clients based on their role as agents in an agent-principal relation-
ship. 52 Additionally, nonlawyer literary agents may be liable for
breach of contract if the agent-author agreement contains a provision
that the agent is not to reveal confidential information learned during
the course of representing the author.
5 3
Designing a System of Protection for Both Attorney/
Agents and the Authors They Represent
As discussed earlier, Swifty Lazar did not use written contracts
with his clients. However, given the nature of this relationship and
the possible pitfalls which could befall the ALA, it is important to
memorialize in writing the parameters of the agent-client relationship
prior to proceeding with negotiations on behalf of the author. But
what are the most important clauses in this contract which will protect
both the author and the ALA?
51. MODEL RULE 1.6 (1983).
52. See, e.g., Anderson, infra note 76; see also Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884,890-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984) (an attorney who was not even repre-
senting the artist, but was involved in explaining the contracts to him, still had a fiduciary
duty toward both the artist and his wife).
53. See infra Part IV.
[Vol. 18:245HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
THE ETHICAL ROLES OF' ATTORNEY/LITERARY AGENTS
A. Concerns Regarding the Afforney/Literary Agent - Client/Author
Agreement
By examining agency agreements, it is possible to target those
clauses that should be highlighted and stressed for purposes of pro-
tecting the ALAs and the authors whom they represent. More impor-
tantly, an attorney should phrase this agreement in the most basic
language so that it is both clear and understandable to the lay person
author.54 This agreement may be accomplished by two means: (1) as
an agreement "letter '55 between the author and the ALA (which is a
contract expressed in the form of a letter between the contracting par-
ties),56 or (2) through a more formal means: an actual contract.57 For
purposes of protecting both the CA and his ALA, a formal agree-
ment, although more time consuming to draft, is preferable because it
lays out with greater specificity the areas of greatest concern to both
parties in the event of a dispute.58
B. What is Being Represented?
The first concern when drafting the author-agent agreement is the
manuscript itself. What exactly is the author promising to deliver to
the agent for representation? 59 The more clearly this "property" can
be described, the less difficulty will arise in the event of a dispute.
60 If
possible, the property should be described with regard to its subject
area, its approximate or estimated length in words, and any specific
details which can be used to define this work as unique. Additionally,
if the author submits a "partial" manuscript and does not yet have a
completed one, which is often the case, the ALA should have a con-
tractual "out" in 'the event the author does not deliver a completed
manuscript within a set period of time. This period should be of rea-
sonable duration and should be extended for explicit reasons set forth
in'the contract, such as author illness. Nonattorney agents should also
include this clause in their author-literary agent agreement for protec-
tion against claims of copyright infringement.61
54. See BUNNIN & BEREN, supra note 6.
55. Eugene H. Winnick, Literary Agent's Checklist and Agreement, in LEGAL AND
BUSINESS ASPECTS OF BOOK PUBLISHING 1988, at 9 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 250, 1988).
56. Id.
57. ALEXANDER LINDEY, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS 1,
4 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining contract drafting in the entertainment industry).
58. Id.
59. See Levin, supra note 35, at 412.
60. See The Copyright Act of 1976 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp IV
1986)).
61. Id.
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C. Ownership of the Work
The author must explicitly warrant in the author-literary agent
contract that he or she reserves the legal rights to the work in question
and where necessary, this individual may be asked to produce' copy-
right forms for unpublished works copyrighted in the author's name.62
This will be particularly important when the ALA is dealing with third
parties.
Although the nonattorney agent can be liable for fraudulent mis-
representation, the ALA is bound by legal ethical standards.6 3 In the
event that an ALA learns that her client does not have the rights to
the work, she cannot allow the buyer to harbor the incorrect assump-
tion that the seller has rights to the work. Model Rule 4.1 provides:
"In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a ... fraudulent act by a client...
Nonattorney agents may be subject to expulsion from the volun-
tary trade organization, the Association of Author's Representatives
(AAR), based on the AAR's code of ethics.65
D. Scope of Agency
As discussed above, because the principal-agent relationship may
in some also situations be characterized as an author-attorney rela-
tionship, it is critical that both parties elaborate upon the scope and
extent of authority the author vests in the agent. These provisions
should include whether the attorney has the right to sell the property
to publishers, motion picture studios, television production compa-
nies, and foreign entities. Model Rule 1.2 states: "(a) A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representa-
tion.., and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they
are pursued .... (c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of representa-
tion if the client consents after consultation. ' 66 The ALA has a duty
to represent her client zealously in attempting to sell the work. It is
important to remember, however, that for the attorney to work effec-
62. Id § 204(a) ("A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is
not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is
in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized
agent.").
63. MODEL RULE 4.1 (1983).
64. Id.
65. See HERMAN, supra note 31.
66. MODEL RULE 1.2 (1983).
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tively, the client author should give him in writing the latitude to ne-
gotiate effectively on the author's behalf.
Also, the ALA should limit her relationship with the client au-
thor to representing the work. Although the nonattorney agent is lim-
ited to representing the client's creative property, the ALA has the
opportunity to represent the client author in other legal contexts, in-
cluding the drafting of a will, representation in a criminal matter, or
settling a marital dispute. The ALA should refrain from engaging in
such types of work for his or her client who is also an author for whom
he or she acts as an agent.
E. Period of Agency
Limiting the length of the relationship between literary agent and
author in the ALA-CA agreement is a particularly tricky problem be-
cause the duration will vary based on the parties and the project(s)
involved. Additionally, if a manuscript meets with little initial success,
many agents (lawyer and nonlawyer alike) representing new or un-
proven authors may be inclined to stop vigorously trying to sell the
work because they may question its commercial value.67
For practical purposes, a finite term should be set out in the con-
tract.68 The contract should also state that if the work marketed by
the current agent is later sold, in similar form, the former agent has
the right to a commission. An agent should not be given the right to a
commission on future works commenced after the agreement has
ended. Again, pursuant to Model Rule 1.2, it is important to define
the length of the relationship so that both the ALA and the client
author know where they stand.69
F. Report of Agent's Activities
The author-literary agent agreement should contain a provision
providing for regular status reports to the client author. An ALA has
a greater duty than her nonattorney counterpart to keep the client
informed. This is based on Model Rule 1.4, which states: "(a) A law-
yer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a mat-
ter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
67. See, e.g., POTTER, supra note 4.
68. For example, one year. However, certain publishing agreement scholars en-
courage literary agent contracts to have open-ended period clauses. See, e.g., Winnick,
supra note 55. The problem with this arrangement is that neither party has a firm sense of
the duration of the agency representation.
69. MODEL RULE 1.2 (1983).
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to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the repre-
sentation. '70 Because of this ethical rule, and as a service to the cli-
ent, the ALA should provide regular status reports to the client as
frequently as four times per year. A nonattorney agent who belongs
to the AAR is required by its rules to promptly provide a CA with a
status report, but only after the author requests one.7'
G. Commission on the Sale of Work
The ALA-CA contract should include a clause that clearly state's
the ALA's fees for representing the author's work. This provision
helps to avoid disputes about the amount the ALA is entitled to re-
ceive. It is interesting to note that although Model Rule 1.5 enumer-
ates "time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly ' 72 as factors in determining whether legal fees are reason-
able, ALAs have not run into trouble for reaping enormous commis-
sions while investing relatively small amounts of time and labor.73
H. Breach of Contract
In the interest of the client author, the literary agent-author con-
tract should include provisions for Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) to resolve disputes between the author and ALA. ADR is not
only more cost-effective than traditional litigation, it is also much
faster than waiting to get onto overcrowded court dockets.74
Pursuant to Model Rule 1.16, "[a] client has a right to discharge a
lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for pay-
ment for the lawyer's services. ' 75 Therefore, the client will be held
liable for the amount of work already performed by the ALA. The
nonattorney agent may petition the courts for specific performance in
the form of reinstatement as their former client's agent. However,
based on ethical considerations and the client's ability to dismiss an
attorney at will, the ALA can only recover monetary damages flowing
from the breach of contract.
70. MODEL RULE 1.4 (1983).
71. See infra note 87.
72. MODEL RuLE 1.5 (1983).
73. See, e.g., Lennon, supra note 7.
74. See, e.g., JoHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DisPuTE RESOLUTION 390
(1989).
75. MODEL RULE 1.16 cmt. (1983).
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IV
The Differences and Similarities Between
Nonattorney and Attorney/Agents and
Mechanisms for Policing Each
Both ALAs and nonattorney literary agents act as fiduciaries for
their clients.76 Both serve in an agency capacity for their principal,
and as such, maintain both actual and apparent authority to bind their
clients in negotiations with third parties with whom they are doing
business.7 Literary agents, attorney and nonattorney alike, have no
institutionalized trade associations regulating who can or cannot act as
a literary agent.78
Until recently, two major organizations existed to which literary
agents could voluntarily apply.79 The Society of Author's Representa-
tives (SAR) was the older and more established organization. Its
members, such as the William Morris Agency, tended to be more es-
tablished and often more influential agencies. 80 The Independent Lit-
erary Agents Association (ILAA) was a newer group whose member
agencies were often more recently formed.8 ' In 1992, however, these
organizations merged to become the Association of Authors' Repre-
sentatives (AAR).82 Although this organization does not have the
power to police literary agents, it has formulated criteria for member-
ship and promulgated an ethical code.83
Members of the AAR must agree in writing to uphold the Code
of Ethics (AAR Code). Several clauses in the AAR Code parallel
standards set forth in the Legal Code of Ethics, including a require-
ment that AAR members refrain from defrauding their clients and
members of the general public.'
76. See, e.g., Joseph B. Anderson, Professional Responsibility 101: A Response to Con-
flicts in the Entertainment Industry?... Not!, 11 ENT. & SPORTS L. 8 (1993).
77. Id.
78. The 1978 Talent Agency Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 1978 Act].,
79. See POTTER, supra note 4.
80. The 1978 Act, supra note 78.
81. Id.
82. See HERMAN, supra note 31.
83. Id.
84. Id. AAR Canon of Ethics, Clause 1, states:
They [members of the AAR] pledge their support to the Association itself and to
the principles of honorable coexistence, directness, and honesty in their relation-
ships with their co-members. They undertake to never mislead, deceive, dupe,
defraud, or victimize their clients, other members of the association, the general
,public, or any other person with whom they do business as a member of the
association.
1996]
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Paragraph Two of the AAR Code requires that members keep
their clients' money in separate bank accounts to prevent commin-
gling of assets,85 paralleling Model Rule 1.15.86 Paragraph Four in-
structs members to regularly inform their clients about their dealings
concerning the client,87 quite similar to Model Rule 1.4.88 Paragraph
Five, similar to Model Rule 1.7,89 addresses conflict of interest dilem-
mas and cautions against representing buyers and sellers in the same
literary transaction unless both parties agree and are offered the op-
portunity to seek outside representation. 90
Still, the codes contain significant differences. The AAR Code,
Clause Seven, requires that member agents keep their clients' finan-
cial affairs private and confidential, except as required by law. 91 This
diverges somewhat from the legal ethical canon which requires, with
some exceptions, that all communications made within the context of
the attorney-client relationship are privileged. Unlike the AAR
Code, the ABA ethical canons do not limit the duty of confidentiality
for attorneys solely to financial matters.92 The AAR Code, Clause
Id. Model Rule 4.1, requiring truthfulness in dealings with others on the client's behalf, is
similar.
85. Clause TwO reads in pertinent part:
Members shall take responsible measures to protect the security and integrity of
clients' funds. Members must maintain separate bank accounts for money due
their clients so that there is no commingling of clients' and members' funds. Mem-
bers shall deposit funds received on behalf of clients promptly upon receipt, and
shall make payments of domestic earnings due clients promptly, but in no event
later than ten business days after clearance.
HERMAN, supra note 31.
86. MODEL RULE 1.5(a) (1983) (directing lawyers to keep their clients' funds separate
from their own).
87. HERMAN, supra note 31. AAR Code, Clause Four, states that "[a] member shall
keep each client apprised of matters entrusted to the member and shall promptly furnish
such information as the client may reasonably request." Id.
88. MODEL RULE 1.4(a) (1983) (stating that "a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter").
89. Model Rule 1.7 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the repre-
sentation of that client may be materially limited by lawyers' responsibilities to another
client" unless the clients consent after an "explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved." MODEL RULE 1.7 (1983).
90. HERMAN, supra note 31. AAR Code, Clause Five addresses conflict of interest
issues:
"Members shall not represent both buyer and seller in the same literary transaction except
in special instances wherein the member notifies both parties before any negotiations pro-
ceed and offers the opportunity to either party to arrange for other representation in that
transaction." IL
91. Id. The AAR Code, Clause Seven provides: "Members shall treat their clients'
financial affairs as private and confidential, except for information customarily disclosed to
interested parties as part of the process of placing rights as required by law, or, if agreed
with the client, for other purposes." Id.
92. MODEL RULE 1.6(a) (1983).
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Eight, states that reading fees, charged by agents when considering a
potential client's work for representation, are subject to abuse and are
therefore discouraged by the AAR. They are, however, chargeable by
members who before October 30, 1991 registered their intent to
charge such fees.93
V
Statutory Policing of Attorney Talent Agents
As evidenced by the previous sections, ALAs have more ethical
obligations constraining their actions than nonattorney agents. ALAs,
however, have the added advantage of credibility because of the polic-
ing standards of their profession. ALAs possess the enhanced ability
to scrutinize contracts and perform negotiations, armed with the ex-
pertise unique to a legal education.
In 1978, California adopted the Talent Agencies Act, designed to
"prevent improper persons from becoming artists' managers and to
regulate such activity for the protection of the public."'9 Writers are
expressly included within the parameters of this act under section
1700.4(b).9 5 The California Labor Commissioner has taken the posi-
tion that California lawyers acting as talent agents, though also regu-
lated by the California State Bar, are not exempt from the Talent
Agencies Act.96 California courts, however, have not decided the is-
sue. The courts have determined that a lawyer not licensed in Califor-
nia who acts to procure employment for a client in California is
subject to the Act. In one case, because a lawyer did not obtain a
license under the Act, he was deemed an "unlicensed talent agent"
and ordered to refund commissions.97
Under the California Talent Agencies Act, an individual running
a talent agency or representing talent must apply for a license from
93. HERMAN, supra note 31. The AAR Code, Clause Eight provides:
The AAR believes that the practice of literary agents charging clients or potential
clients fees for reading and evaluating literary work (including outlines, propos-
als, and partial or complete manuscripts) is subject to serious abuse that reflects
adversely on our profession. For this reason the AAR discourages that practice.
New members and members who had not, before October 30, 1991, registered
their intent to continue to charge reading fees shall not charge such fees.
Il
94. HERMAN, supra note 31.
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
•96. See James B. O'Brien III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California's
Talent Agencies Act. A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CAL. L. REv. 471
(1992).
97. Id
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the Labor Commissioner. 8 To receive this license, the applicant must
submit two sets of fingerprints and affidavits by at least two reputable
residents of the city or county in which the talent agency will operate.
These affidavits should attest to the good moral character of the indi-
vidual seeking to run a talent agency.99
Interestingly, this Act requires all talent agencies to submit con-
tract forms used by the talent agency and a fee schedule to the Labor
Commissioner when entering into written contracts with artists.1°°
The Talent Agencies Act also requires agents to include in their con-
tracts a provision referring any controversies relating to the contract,
either to arbitration'' or the Labor Commission for adjustment. 0 2
It has been argued that the 1978 Talent Agencies Act is unfair
and duplicative for ALAs and was never designed to police these indi-
viduals.'03 Despite this criticism, the Talent Agencies Act provides
much needed protection for artists easily susceptible to unscrupulous
agents. Despite the fact, that attorneys have their own set of ethical
rules, this Act is not unduly duplicative. The Act simply ensures that
ALAs fulfill the same stringent standards required of their nonat-
torney counterparts, and the need to safeguard clients outweighs any
burden imposed by the duplicative nature of the Act.
VI
Conclusion
Over the past decade, lawyers have emerged as a dominant force
in the entertainment industry. ALAs possess the ability to negotiate
on behalf of their CAs and to draft their contracts with legal acumen.
There are numerous differences between ALAs and nonattorney
agents in terms of their latitude in negotiations, ability to represent
potentially conflicting projects, and ability to interpret and draft legal
documents on behalf of clients. Lawyers acting in the capacity of a
writer's agent must be acquainted with several provisions of the
Model Rules, including conflicts of interest, fees, communication with
the CA, and competence to practice as an ALA.
Unquestionably, both nonattorney agents and ALAs need to be
policed to protect artists from those agents who may take advantage
of unestablished clients' relatively poor bargaining strength. How-
98. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
99. Id. § 1700.6.
100. Id. §§ 1700.23-1700.24.
101. Id. § 1700.45.
102. Id. § 1700.23.
103. See generally O'Brien, supra note 96.
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ever, ALAs must also protect their own interests by insisting upon
unambiguous written contracts with their clients. These contracts
should enumerate in detail the scope and particulars of the relation-
ship, including a detailed description of the project(s) being repre-
sented, fees, period and scope of the agency, and provisions for
dispute resolution in the event of a breach of contract.

